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9.1  Introduction 
This paper develops possible theoretical explanations for the observed 
racial differential in stability of  earnings. Most research on racial factors 
in the labor market has focused on observed differences in the average 
earnings of  whites and blacks in the United States. However, some 
authors have also recognized the existence of  a racial differential in 
earnings stability over business cycles. For example, Wohlstetter and 
Coleman (1972) observe that year-to-year percentage changes in median 
family income and median income of  persons were roughly parallel to 
business cycles and greater in  absolute values for nonwhites than for 
whites from 1947 through 1967. Deviations from trend of  percentage 
changes in median family income and median income of  persons were 
much greater for nonwhites than for whites over that period. 
In order to address these observations, this paper draws together two 
recent theoretical developments in labor economics: the theory of  the 
risk-shifting function of  labor contracts  (see, for example, Azariadis 
1975; Baily 1974; Grossman 1977; and Stiglitz 1974), and the theory of 
statistical  discrimination  (see, for  example, Arrow  1972,  1973; and 
Phelps 1972). A central idea developed in the paper is that statistical 
discrimination can generate distortions in market behavior-for  exam- 
ple, different competitive equilibria for intrinsically identical groups, as 
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suggested by Arrow (1973) and Starrett (1976). The theoretical analysis 
focuses specifically on the distortions in worker behavior that can result 
from statistical discrimination in the market for risk-shifting arrange- 
ments, and shows how the nature of these distortions depends on interac- 
tions between the price of  risk shifting and the average reliability of 
workers and on the presence or absence of  intrinsic differences in the 
attitudes of  different groups of  workers toward reliability. 
The theory of  the risk-shifting function of  labor contracts develops 
what can be denoted as a Knightian view of  the entrepreneur and the 
firm. In this view, certain individuals, either because they are intrinsically 
less timid or because they have substantial wealth which facilitates asset 
diversification, exhibit less risk-averse behavior than the average person. 
The equilibrium structure of  a market economy finds these individuals 
specializing in the entrepreneurial role, forming firms ,  and employing 
labor services. According to the theory, this systematic difference be- 
tween  firms and their workers with  regard  to risk  aversion leads to 
long-term contractual commitments in which firms absorb risk that would 
otherwise be borne by workers. 
Several recent papers noted above apply this view to an analysis of risk 
associated with variations in the value of  worker output. Specifically, 
these papers suggest that labor contracts explicitly or implicitly involve 
two transactions:  (1) firms pay workers for the productivity of  labor 
services; (2) risk-averse workers purchase from less risk-averse firms 
insurance against fluctuations in earnings that would result, in the ab- 
sence of such insurance, from variations in the value of  worker output. 
The insurance  arrangement involves (1) a premium payment  by  the 
worker, which takes the form of  an excess of the value of  the worker’s 
product over his earnings when the value of his product is high; and (2) an 
indemnity to the worker,  which  takes the form of  an  excess of  the 
worker’s earnings over the value of  his product when it  is low. This 
arrangement shifts risk  to the firm and facilitates the stabilization of 
worker consumption, making it unnecessary for the worker to accumu- 
late a large store of  assets for that purpose. 
The point of departure for the present analysis is the observation that 
once the value of  worker output is known, either the employer or the 
worker has an incentive to default on a risk-shifting agreement. If  the 
value of  worker output is low, employers can obtain short-run gains by 
temporarily  lowering wages to take  advantage  of  cheaper substitute 
labor. If the value of worker output is high, workers can make themselves 
better off in the short run by demanding a temporary wage increase or by 
quitting their jobs to take advantage of  more lucrative opportunities 
available elsewhere. The term “reliability” refers here to an individual’s 
propensity to forego short-run gains to comply with an existing risk- 297  Risk Shifting, Statistical Discrimination, and Stability of  Earnings 
shifting agreement. The analysis below focuses on default behavior-that 
is, “unreliability”-on the part of workers. 
In choosing between default and reliable behavior, a worker considers 
the short-run increase in consumption that he can obtain by defaulting 
and weighs it against a variety of  incentives for reliability. These incen- 
tives include such factors as moral aversion to default, the value of a good 
reputation for reliability in facilitating future risk-shifting  arrangements, 
and the preservation of claims to deferred compensation, such as non- 
vested pensions. The present paper abstracts, for simplicity,  from consid- 
erations other than the moral factor. The analysis assumes, critically, that 
this moral aversion to default varies among workers, but that it is typical- 
ly finite. Specifically, for a given high value of  his product, whether a 
particular  worker  will  evince reliable behavior  depends on both  the 
strength of  his moral aversion to default and the terms of  his existing 
risk-shifting arrangement,  particularly the excess of  the value of  his 
product over his contractual earnings. Further research will  deal with 
such related considerations as the effect on worker behavior of a relation 
between individual work history and the terms of  risk-shifting arrange- 
ments, and the interplay between cyclical risk shifting, on which the 
present discussion  focuses, and changes in productivity over the life cycle. 
A general point worth noting is that, mainly because of  the subjective 
motivation aspect of  labor services, these examples of  incentives for 
reliable behavior all involve extralegal considerations. 
As essential assumption for the analysis is that employers do not know 
the moral characteristics of  individual workers and, consequently, are 
unable to identify and avoid hiring unreliable workers. This informa- 
tional  imperfection means that, in  order to avoid expected los_ses in 
risk-shifting arrangements, employers can offer to absorb risk only on 
terms that reflect their beliefs about the proportion of workers who will 
behave reliably.’ 
Employers adjust these beliefs, and, thus, the terms of  risk-shifting 
arrangements, on the basis of their actual observations of average worker 
reliability. However, as noted above, the terms of risk-shifting arrange- 
ments affect individual choice between reliable behavior and default. 
This interaction between employer beliefs and worker behavior creates a 
possibility for multiple competitive equilibria-that  is, there may  be 
more than one employer estimate of average reliability such that worker 
behavior will be induced that will confirm employer beliefs and be in- 
vulnerable to competitive attempts to increase expected profits by mar- 
ginal adjustments in the terms of  risk shifting. 
The employers’ inability to determine an individual’s reliability before 
hiring also makes it likely that employers engage in statistical discrimina- 
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employers can observe easily, such as race and sex, and if  employers 
believe that such identifiable groups of  workers differ with respect to 
average reliability, competition will cause employers to take an indi- 
vidual’s  observable  characteristics  into  account  when  making  risk- 
shifting arrangements. Consequently, different identifiable groups will 
make risk-shifting arrangements on different terms. 
Whether or not employer beliefs about the average reliability of identi- 
fiable groups are correct, describing this employer behavior as discrim- 
inatory seems appropriate because individuals who may be equally reli- 
able receive different treatment. The use of  the term  “statistical” to 
describe discrimination in this context reflects the fact that employer 
behavior is based on belief  in the existence of  empirical correlations 
between reliability and the observable characteristics of workers, rather 
than, for example, on taste or distaste for those characteristics. 
Given the interaction between employer beliefs about reliability and 
worker behavior, statistical discrimination generates two important im- 
plications regarding differences in  the stability of  earnings of  different 
groups. First, if the market for risk-shifting arrangements possesses mul- 
tiple equilibria, then even if two identifiable groups are identical with 
respect to the distribution of  aversion to default among their members, 
they  can exhibit persistent  differences with respect to reliability, the 
terms on which they shift risk to employers, and stability of  earnings. 
Second, if two identifiable groups differ with respect to the distribution of 
aversion to default among their members, then in equilibrium they can 
differ more or less with respect to actual reliability than they would if 
employers pooled them and absorbed risk from both groups on terms that 
reflected the average reliability of  the two groups combined. 
In what follows, section 9.2 describes a specific analytical framework. 
Within this framework, section 9.3 analyzes the terms of  risk-shifting 
arrangements and the worker’s choice between reliable and unreliable 
behavior. Section 9.4 discusses the characteristics of  equilibrium in the 
market for risk-shifting arrangements and derives sufficient conditions 
for  the existence of a unique equilibrium. Section 9.5 analyzes the stabil- 
ity properties of  equilibria when multiple equilibria exist. Section 9.6 
analyzes the impact of statistical discrimination on risk-shifting arrange- 
ments. Section 9.7 analyzes the implications of  more sophisticated em- 
ployer behavior that takes account of  the influence of  the terms of  risk 
shifting on worker reliability. Section 9.8 contains a summary of the main 
results and briefly discusses the implications of the theoretical analysis for 
a program of  empirical research. 
9.2  Analytical Framework 
Consider a labor market in which, as discussed above, employers and 
workers differ in their  attitudes toward  risk.  Specifically, employers 299  Risk Shifting, Statistical Discrimination, and Stability of  Earnings 
compose a large class of identical individuals who behave as if they were 
risk neutral. In other words, their utility is a linear function of consump- 
tion, and, thus, they are indifferent between a constant consumption 
stream and a fluctuating consumption stream that has the same average 
value. In addition, these employers have a deserved reputation for com- 
plete reliability, which means that they never fail to comply with the 
risk-shifting agreements that they have made. 
Workers, in contrast, compose a large class of  individuals whose de- 
gree of risk aversion is identical and positive. In other words, their utility 
is a concave function of  consumption, and, thus, they prefer a constant 
consumption stream to a fluctuating consumption stream that has the 
same average value. In addition, worker utility functions reflect an exoge- 
nous moral aversion to default, which is finite, differs among individuals, 
and is distributed such that, given the terms on which risk shifting takes 
place, some workers behave reliably and some do not. 
The class of workers is divisible into large groups according to observ- 
able characteristics such as race and sex. Each such group has a reputa- 
tion for average reliability. The analysis in the next three sections focuses 
on transactions between the employers and one such group of workers. 
The reputation for reliability of this group is such that employers believe 
that  a proportion  R  of  the group will  comply with  the risk-shifting 
agreements that they make, where 0 5  R 5  1. 
In order to  focus on the importance of risk shifting, the analysis  ignores 
the technological aspects of the organization of production. Such factors 
as the advantages of team production, firm-specific  human capital, costs 
of  adjusting employment, and mobility costs surely influence both the 
organization of  production and the form of  optimal long-term agree- 
ments between firms and workers. However, the present analysis consid- 
ers only the role played by firms in absorbing risk that their employees 
otherwise would bear. Specifically, the analysis assumes that each indi- 
vidual in the economy would be equally productive whether he chose to 
be an independent producer, an employer, or an employee. In other 
words, the assumed technology makes production solely an independent 
activity. In addition, the analysis abstracts from interpersonal differences 
in productivity. Thus, the value of  output is perfectly correlated across 
individuals. 
The value of  per capital output, denoted by X,  is the product of  the 
number of  units of  output per capita and, if  this output is not directly 
consumed, the exchange ratio between consumption goods and produced 
output. Either or both of  the factors in this product can be subject to 
variation. Specifically, assume that the actual value of Xis determined at 
periodic intervals by serially independent drawings from an exogenously 
determined population. The interval between these drawings defines a 
unit of time. The population of  X  is such that 300  Herschel I. Grossman and Warren T. Trepeta 
Xl  with probability a1 
X2  with probability a2 
X={ 
where X2  >  Xl  2  0, a1  + a2  = 1, and 0 <  a1  <  1. Thus, X2  characterizes a 
good state of  nature and Xl  characterizes a bad state of  nature. The 
expected value of  per capita output, denoted as X=,, is alXl  + a2X2.* 
Another convenient simplification is that individuals have no alterna- 
tive uses,  such as direct production  of  consumption goods or leisure 
activities, to which to devote their time. This assumption enables the 
analysis to avoid analyzing employment schedules, which would involve 
variations in the amount of time devoted to the production of marketable 
output, and to focus on the earnings schedules stipulated in labor con- 
tracts.  Grossman  (1978)  analyzes the  determination of  employment 
schedules in labor contracts involving risk shifting. 
9.3  The Decisions of Workers and Firms 
9.3.1  The Worker Consumption Schedule 
A worker consumption schedule under a risk-shifting  arrangement is a 
vector (wl,  w2),  where w1(w2) is the worker’s earnings if X  turns out to 
equal X1(X2).  Given (wl,  w2),  the worker receives an insurance indem- 
nity equal to  (wl -  Xl)  if the bad state of  nature occurs, and al(wl -  Xl)  is 
the worker’s expected indemnity per period. Alternatively, the worker is 
obliged to pay an insurance premium equal to (X2  -  w2)  if  the good state 
occurs, and a2(X2  -  w2)  is the worker’s expected premium payment per 
period  if  he complies with the insurance arrangement. The worker’s 
expected premium per period is zero if he is unreliable. Thus, if  a worker 
complies with  an insurance  agreement, he is effectively charged, on 
average, a price of  a2(X2  -  w2)/a1(w1  -  XJ  units of  consumption in the 
good state per unit of indemnity consumption received in the bad state. 
Let Q denote this price. 
A  reliable worker, when entering into an employment agreement, 
takes  Q and the distribution  of  X  as given, and selects (wl,  w2) to 
maximize expected utility alu(wl)  +  a2u(w2),  subject to the budget con- 
straint  Q =  a2(X2  -  w2)Ia1(w1  -  Xl)  and the nonnegativity constraints 
w1 rX,  and w210,  where u(w)  is the worker’s concave utility function. 
The constraint w1  zXl rules out the possibility that these individuals 
might try to play the entrepreneurial role, in which they have no reputa- 
tion for reliability. This maximization involves the first-order condition 
u’(wl) =  Qu’(wz), which in turn implies worker demand schedules for 
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For consumption in the bad state, we have w1 =  max [f(Q), XI]  and 
f[u’(Xl)lu’(Xz)]  =  X,,f(  1) =  x,  andf‘(Q) <  0. According to this demand 
schedule, as long as Q is less than the ratio of the marginal utilities of X, 
and Xz,  each worker desires to reduce his risk by contracting for w1 to 
exceed X,.  As Q decreases, his desired level of  w1  increases. If  Q is equal 
to unity, he wants w1 to equal the average value of  per capital output, 
which, according to his budget constraint, is equivalent to making w1 
equal to w2  and thereby avoiding all risk. As noted above, we assume that 
unreliable workers demand consumption in state 1  according to the same 
schedule. 
For consumption in the good state, we have 
w2= min [g(Q), XZ]  and g[u‘(X,)lu’(X2)]  =X2 
g(l)=x,  and 
-  WlU”(W1)  <  w1  > 
g’(Q)?O  as RRA(w,) = 
u’(w1)  > w1- x, 
The variable RRA(w,) denotes the coefficient of  relative risk aversion 
that  characterizes  a  worker’s  utility  function  at  consumption  level 
wI =f(Q).  Note that for a decrease in  Q the income and substitution 
effects  on w1  are both positive, whereas the income effect on w2 is positive 
and the substitution effect on w2 is negative. Consequently, the net effect 
of  a change in  Q on  w2 depends on the size of  RRA(w,) relative to 
wlI(wl -Xl). This  result  reflects  the  familiar  proposition  that  the 
strength of an income effect depends on the shape of the utility function 
and on the quantity currently  demanded of  the item whose price is 
changing. Note further that, given x1  >0, g’(Q) can be negative only if 
RRA(w,) exceeds one. 
9.3.2  The Determination of  Q 
Let P denote the number of  units of  consumption that employers 
expect to receive from workers in the good state of nature per unit of 
indemnity consumption paid out to workers in the bad state of  nature. 
Assume, for simplicity, that P is equal to unity in competitive equilib- 
rium. This assumption implies that aggregate worker demand for con- 
sumption in the bad state does not exceed the value of aggregate output in 
the bad state. See Grossman (1977) for a fuller discussion of  the deter- 
mination of the equilibrium price for risk shifting. 
If  employers expect some workers to default on a risk-shifting agree- 
ment-that  is, if R is less than unity-this  anticipated unreliability drives 
a wedge between  and Q. Specifically, given Z? and w2,  employers expect 302  Herschel I. Grossman and Warren T. Trepeta 
to receive a premium equal to fi(Xz  -  wz)  from a representative worker in 
the good state, and Ra2(X2  -  wz)  is the expected premium per worker per 
period. Employers expect to  pay indemnity equal to  (wl -  X,)  per worker 
in the bad state, and al(wl -XI) is the expected indemnity payment per 
worker per period. Thus, 
a2(X2 -  w2) =! 
%(wI-xl)  fi 
Q= 
where 0 I  R I  1. This relation indicates that, to expect a given P, em- 
ployers must charge workers a higher price for indemnity consumption as 
their  estimate  of  worker  reliability  decreases.  Finally,  this  section 
assumes that employers form their belief about the proportion of workers 
who are reliable by  observing the proportion of  workers who actually 
behave reliably, denoted by R, and that this learning process involves 
gradual adjustment of fi in the direction of R. Section 9.7 below considers 
the possibility that employers take account of  the fact that the terms of 
risk-shifting arrangements affect worker reliability. 
9.3.3  The Choice between Reliability and Unreliability 
As discussed above, a worker who has entered a risk-shifting arrange- 
ment has an incentive to default on the arrangement when the good state 
of  nature occurs. Specifically, if  the worker threatens to leave his em- 
ployer or actually quits to  work elsewhere in the good state of nature, he 
can obtain X2,  the full value of  his product, rather than w2, the lower 
consumption  which  he  has  agreed  to accept  under  the  risk-shifting 
arrangement. Thus, a worker who chooses default over reliable behavior 
obtains an increase in utility from consumption equal to u(X2)  minus 
u(w2). However, given his moral aversion to default, if  the ith worker 
behaves unreliably, he suffers a loss of utility, denoted by A, with A,  2  0. 
Thus, assuming, for simplicity, that A, is independent of the terms of  the 
risk-shifting arrangement, unreliable behavior produces a net change in 
utility equal to u(X2)  -  u( w2) -  A  i. A worker chooses to behave unreli- 
ably (reliably) if  this net change is positive (negative or zero). 
Aversion  to default  varies  among individuals. Assuming Ai to be 
distributed in the worker population with cumulative distribution func- 
tion  H(A,;Z)  where  Z  is  a vector  of  parameters of  the distribution 
function, then the aggregation of  individual choices between reliability 
and unreliability yields the following functional relation for the propor- 
tion of  workers who behave reliably: 
R=  ~-H[u(X,)-U(~~);Z]~R(W~;Z) 
For the moment, we can suppress the vector 2, which plays no role in the 
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that R(X2)  =  1,  and the nature of  the  cumulative distribution function and 
the utility function implies that R’(w2)  2  0. Finally, fairly weak restric- 
tions on the form of  H(Ai)-for  example, uniformity or approximate 
normality-imply  that R”(w2)  5  0, either everywhere or at least for suf- 
ficiently high values of  w2. 
9.4  Equilibrium in the Risk-Shifting Market 
Informational equilibrium involves a value of  P equal to unity, and an 
employer estimate of  worker reliability and a corresponding vector of 
worker consumption that induces worker default behavior that confirms 
employers’  beliefs  concerning  reliability.  Thus,  an  informational- 
equilibrium vector of  worker consumption has the property that (wl,  w2) 
maximizes worker utility, given Q, where Q = 1/R, and R =R(w2).  An 
informational equilibrium  is also a competitive equilibrium if  it is in- 
vulnerable to attempts by  employers to increase  expected  profits  by 
experimenting with marginal adjustments in Q. 
Figure 9.1 depicts one example in which the market for risk-shifting 
arrangements possesses a unique informational equilibrium, which is also 
a competitive equilibrium. The locus labeled R =  R(w2)  depicts the rel- 
evant segment of  the  functional relation between actual worker reliability 
and consumption in the good state. As indicated above, the depiction of 
t 
Figure 9.1  Unique Equilibrium. w;(@  <  0 for all RE  [u’(X2)/u’(Xl),  11 304  Herschel I. Grossman and Warren T. Trepeta 
this segment as concave seems reasonable. The locus labeled w2  =  w2(@ 
represents the relation between worker demand for consumption in the 
good state and the estimate of worker reliability held by employers, for 
all @E[U’(X~)/U’(X~),  11-that  is, for all QE[~,  u’(Xl)/uf(X2)].  As de- 
picted in this example, the negative slope of  this locus implies that the 
negative substitution effect on w2  of  an increase in R (decreases in Q) 
outweighs the positive income effect. 
Point E in figure 9.1 represents competitive equilibrium. At point E, R 
equals RE  and workers choose to receive consumption w2E  in the good 
state. Note that consumption in the bad state, wlE,  can be calculated by 
substituting the coordinates of  point E into the worker’s budget con- 
straint. At point E, the locus w2  =  w2(A)  intersects the locus R =  R(w2) 
indicating that w2E  induces a proportion of  workers RE  to behave reli- 
ably, such that RE -  RE,  thereby confirming employer beliefs concerning 
reliability. 
If, either as an initial condition or as a result of employer experimenta- 
tion, R #RE,  workers choose w2  #W2E.  These values of  w2  induce values 
of  R, according to the schedule R=R(w2),  such that  R#R. Conse- 
quently, employers revise R, in accordance with the assumed learning 
process. This learning process moves the system toward point E along the 
locus w2  =  w2(R),  as indicated by arrows attached to that locus. 
An essential question is whether informational equilibrium and com- 
petitive equilibrium in this market generally are unique. Given that R is 
nondecreasing with respect to w2,  a sufficient, but unnecessarily strong, 
condition for uniqueness of both informational equilibrium and competi- 
tive equilibrium is that worker demand for w2  is strictly decreasing with 
respect to R,  as depicted in figure 9.1. However, the above analysis of the 
worker consumption schedule revealed that the income effect associated 
with Q can make w2  a decreasing function of  Q,  and, thus, an increasing 
function of  fi in the relevant range. Specifically, noting that Q = l/R, the 
analysis of worker consumption implies the following lemma about the 
relation between w2  and R: 
(LI)  For all RE[U’(X~)IU‘(X~),  11 
where w1 =f(l/R). 
(L2)  If relative risk aversion is nondecreasing with respect to consump- 
tion, then either (a) there exists a value of  A, denoted as I?*, R* E [uf(X2)/ 
u’(Xl),  11, such that 
The following useful lemmas follow from (Ll). 
>O for RE(R*,  1) 
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or (b) w;(R)<O  for all RE[u’(X~)IU’(X~),  11. 
(L3)  If  relative risk aversion is nondecreasing with respect to consump- 
tion, then 
w;(@ <  0 for all R for which w2(fi)  E (x,  X2) 
To understand L2 and L3, recall that w2[u’(X2)/u’(Xl)]  equals X2, 
whereas w2(  1) equals g,  which is less than X2.  Therefore, for some values 
of RE  [u‘(X2)/ur(X,),  11, the substitution effect of an increase in R on w2 
must dominate the income effect, implying that w;(R) is negative. Fur- 
thermore, if  relative risk aversion is constant or increasing, the income 
effect is always increasing in size relative to the substitution effect. Thus, 
there can exist at most one value of  R, denoted by R*,  for which the two 
effects are exactly offsetting and for which w;(@  equals zero. Moreover, 
the substitution effect dominates and w;(R) is negative for all RE  [ur(X2)/ 
u’(X,), I?*), whereas the income effect dominates and w;(R)  is positive 
for all  values of  R  above  R*. Furthermore, since  w2(1) equals x, 
w;(R)  2  o implies w2(R) I  X. 
Taken together, L1, L2, and L3 imply proposition P1 about equilib- 
rium in the market for risk-shifting arrangements. 
(Pl)  Nondecreasing relative risk aversion is a sufficient condition for 
uniqueness of informational and competitive equilibrium in conjunction 
with either of the following conditions: 
(a) RRA(X)  sX/(X  -  x,)  or 
(b) R(X) I  u’(X2)/u’(Xl) 
To understand the first part of  P1, recall that when R  equals one, 
workers  select  the  consumption  schedule  (w,,  w2)  = (x,  x).  Thus, 
according to L1, the sign of  w;(fi)  at R =  1 depends on the value of 
RZ?A(X). Specifically, if  RRA(x)  is less than (equal to) xl(z-X,), 
then w;(@  is negative (zero) when R equals one. If, in addition, relative 
risk  aversion  is  nondecreasing,  then,  by  L2,  w;(&  is  negative  for 
To understand the second part of  P1, refer to figure 9.2. The locus 
labeled w2 =  w2(@ again depicts the demand for w2. The shape of  this 
locus reflects two assumptions: (1) Relative risk aversion is nondecreas- 
ing, implying, by L3, that the demand locus is negatively sloped for 
wz~(X,  X2); (2) RRA(X)>X/(X-X,):  implying, by  L2, that the de- 
mand  locus has  a  positive  slope  for  RE(R*, ll. The locus labeled 
R =  R(w2)  again depicts the relevant segment of the reliability function. 
If, as shown, R(X)  I  u’(X2)Iur(Xl),  then the reliability function neces- 
sarily lies below the locus w2 =  w2(R)  for w, IZ.  Furthermore, since the 
reliability function is nondecreasing on the interval (x,  X2), whereas the 
demand locus is negatively sloped on this interval, the two loci intersect 
once and only once at point E. 
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Figure 9.2  Unique Equilibrium, R(@  <  u’ (X2)luf  (XI) 
The analysis of worker consumption also implies proposition P2 about 
equilibrium. 
(P2)  The following condition is sufficient for uniqueness of  informa- 
tional and competitive equilibrium: 
This condition says that worker reliability decreases slowly as w2 falls 
from X2  to zero. To understand P2, note that, given this restriction on the 
reliability function, the existence of  more than one equilibrium would 
imply that worker demand for w1 remains constant or increases with 
respect to its relative price Q, for some range of  Q less than u’(Xl)l 
u’(Xz).  However, the income and substitution effects of an increase in Q 
both serve to reduce worker demand for wl. 
9.5  Dynamics of  the Market for Risk Shifting 
in the Presence of Multiple Equilibria 
The results of  the previous section imply that if  the market for risk- 
shifting arrangements exhibits multiple informational and competitive 
equilibria, then all of the following conditions hold: 
(a) The  demand  for  w2 is  not  strictly decreasing  for RE[U‘(X~)I 
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(b) R’(w,)>RI(X,-w,)  for some w,E[O, X,],  and 
(c)  R(X)  >  uf(X2)/uf(Xl),  if  relative risk aversion is nondecreasing 
The analysis in this  section  assumes that  these conditions hold  and 
focuses on the stability properties of  informational equilibria and the 
relation between informational equilibrium and competitive equilibrium. 
Figure 9.3 depicts a situation in which the market for risk-shifting 
arrangements possesses  three  informational  equilibria.  If  R  initially 
equals RE,  RF,  or R,,  then worker behavior confirms employer beliefs 
concerning reliability, and the market remains in informational equilib- 
rium at point E, F,  or G, respectively. As in earlier figures, arrows 
attached to the locus labeled w2 =  w,(@  indicate the direction in which 
learning moves the market along this locus. 
The informational equilibrium at point F is locally unstable. Specifi- 
cally, if  R is marginally greater than RFinitially, then R >  R, and learning 
moves the market away from point F  toward point E. Alternatively, if  R 
is marginally less than RF initially, then R <A, and learning moves the 
market away from point F toward point G. 
Because informational equilibrium at point F is locally unstable, it is 
not a competitive equilibrium. Specifically, it is vulnerable to individual 
firms’ experimentation with a value of  R that is marginally greater than 
with respect to consumption. 
t 
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R,.  Suppose that R were to equal RF initially, yielding informational 
equilibrium at point F. If a firm were then to experiment with a slightly 
higher R and a correspondingly lower price of indemnity consumption, it 
would (1) find R>R; (2) earn positive profits; and (3) attract workers 
away from other firms. All firms would have an incentive to raise R and 
lower Q.  Thus, experimentation of  the sort described would move the 
market toward point E. 
The informational equilibria at points E and G are locally stable, and 
thus are competitive equilibria. Specifically, they are vulnerable to nei- 
ther learning on the part of employers nor to marginal experimentation 
by individual employers. 
Points E and G, however,  are not globally stable. Moreover, the 
competitive equilibrium at point G is vulnerable to experimentation with 
much different beliefs by firms. Specifically, if the market were initially in 
competitive equilibrium at point G, and if  firms were to experiment with 
values of  R other than R, but less than RF, worker behavior would 
disconfirm beliefs and learning would return the market to competitive 
equilibrium at G. However, if firms were to experiment with values of R 
greater than RF,  they would attract workers away from other firms and 
learning would move the market toward competitive equilibrium at point 
E. 
9.6  Statistical Discrimination 
This section considers transactions between employers and two large 
groups of  workers, denoted by  W and B, which, as noted above, are 
distinguished by an easily observable characteristic, such as race. Statis- 
tical discrimination means that employers form separate estimates of 
average reliability, kW  and RB,  for the groups. The analysis assumes, for 
simplicity, that employers revise these estimates according to the same 
learning process. Moreover, employers equate P across groups by charg- 
ing a group a price for indemnity consumption that is inversely related to 
the employers’ estimate of the group’s reliability-that  is, 
P1 
Rw  Rw 
Qw=”-=-;-  and 
Statistical discrimination can have the effect of  distorting the market 
behavior of  these two groups, but the nature of the possible distortion 
depends on whether or not the groups are intrinsically different. One 
possibility is that the two groups are identical with respect to the distribu- 
tion of aversion to default among their members. In this case, given the 
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employers do not engage in statistical discrimination, but instead charge 
all workers the same Q based on the average reliability of the total labor 
force,  or if  the  market  for  risk  shifting has  a  unique  competitive 
equilibrium, the observed behavior of  the two groups in this market in 
competitive equilibrium will be indistinguishable. However, if  multiple 
competitive equilibria are possible and if  employers practice statistical 
discrimination, then, depending on initial conditions, the two groups in 
competitive equilibrium can exhibit different average reliability, shift risk 
to employers on different terms, and experience different stability of 
earnings, even though they possess the same propensity to default for a 
given w2. For example, referring to figure 9.3, if  Rw>RF and RB<RF 
initially, then group W attains the superior competitive equilibrium at 
point E while group B attains the inferior competitive equilibrium at 
point G. Furthermore, group B can move to E only if  firms undertake 
major experiments with dB  >  fi,. 
An alternative possibility is that groups W and B actually differ with 
respect to the distribution of  aversion to default among their members. 
Specifically, let K be a positive constant, and assume that, 
RB(w2)  =  RW(W2) - 
In this case, if  employers do not engage in statistical discrimination, both 
Wand B workers select the same w2,  and the difference between Rw and 
RE  equals K. However, if  employers practice statistical discrimination, 
the behavior of the two groups in competitive equilibrium can differ by 
more or less than K. Figures 9.4 and 9.5 illustrate these possibilities. Both 
diagrams assume that competitive equilibrium is unique. 
In figure 9.4, competitive equilibrium for both groups occurs where w2 
is increasing with respect to R. In this case, the difference between Rw 
and RB  is REW minus REB, which is clearly greater than K. Statistical 
discrimination magnifies the exogenous behavioral differences between 
groups. 
In figure 9.5, competitive equilibrium for both groups occurs where w2 
is decreasing with respect to R.  In this case, the difference between Rw 
and RB is clearly smaller than K. Statistical discrimination narrows the 
differences between  groups.  Furthermore, in both this case and the 
previous case, given K, the absolute magnitude of  the difference between 
K and REW minus REB  is greater as reliability is more responsive to 
changes in w2,  and as worker demand for w2 is more sensitive to changes 
in R. 
9.7  More Sophisticated Employer Strategy 
The preceding analysis assumes that employers do not take account of 
the dependence of  worker reliability on the terms of risk-shifting  arrange- 
ments. In other words, employers behave as if  R were an exogenous 310  Herschel I. Grossman and Warren T. Trepeta 
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Figure 9.4  Statistical  Discrimination  Magnifies Differences  between 
Groups 
variable, rather than determined by  the function R(w2;Z).  However, 
such simplistic behavior may not be realistic. After witnessing changes in 
worker reliability that are positively correlated with changes in w2,  em- 
ployers would tend to realize that R is endogenous and to adopt a more 
sophisticated strategy for setting Q that takes account of the functional 
dependence of  R on w2. 
This section analyzes the implications of such a strategy. However, in 
order to retain an element of  informational imperfection, the analysis 
allows the employers to be less than fully informed about the relation 
between R and  w2. This possible ignorance is embodied in  an implicit 
belief, denoted by 2,  about the vector of parameters Z that describe the 
distribution  of  aversion to default. Thus, the employers' estimate of 
average reliability is given by 
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In addition, the analysis assumes that employers revise their beliefs 
about the distribution of aversion to default in response to any observed 
error in their estimate of average reliability, and that this learning process 
involves adjustment of  Z toward 2 in response to any discrepancy be- 
tween R  and R. Note that this learning process need not produce full 
information concerning the relation between R and w2.  Because R(w2;Z) 
is not a one-for-one function of  Z,  for any given value of  w2, equality 
between R(w2;Z)  and R(w2;Z)  does not imply that Z is equal to 2.  (See 
Trepeta 1981 for a fuller discussion of  this problem as well as the other 
issues raised in this section.) 
The main behavioral consequence of employers’ taking account of the 
dependence of  R on w2 is that they do not allow workers to choose any 
amount of  indemnity for the bad state at a fixed level of  Q. Instead, 
employers offer workers a schedule of  quantity and price given by the 
functional relation 
Q  = l/R(w2;Z)  =  Q(w2;Z)  with Qf  (w2;Z)  5  0 
The worker, when entering into an employment agreement, takes this 
relation between Q and w2 as given. Thus, the worker’s problem now is to 
Figure 9.5  StatisticaI  Discrimination  Narrows  Differences  between 
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choose (wl, w2)  to maximize alu(wl)  +  a2u(w2),  subject to the budget 
constraint  Q(w2;2)  =  a2(X2  -  w2)/a1(w1 -XI), and  the  nonnegativity 
constraints w1  ?XI and w210. 
This maximization involves the first-order condition 
u‘(w1)  =  Q(w2;Z.)  ~’(~21 
1 + (x2-  w2)Qf(w2;2)/Q(w2;2) 
If, as in the analysis of  the preceding sections, employers were to set Q 
independently of  w2,  the worker would treat Q’ as being equal to zero, 
and this first-order condition would reduce to the first-order condition of 
section 9.3,  u’(wl) =  Qu’(w2).  However, in the present context, when 
employers adjust Q to allow for the effect of  w2 on R, the worker takes 
Q’(w2;Z)  to be negative. In that case, the worker chooses (wl,  w2)  such 
that u’(wl) is larger than Q(w2;Z)  u’(w2).  In other words, if the purchase 
of  an additional unit of  indemnity raises the price of  all intramarginal 
units, the marginal cost of  indemnity for the individual worker exceeds its 
price. Consequently, the worker would associate with a chosen value of 
Q a lower value of  wl,  and a higher value of  w2,  than he would choose for 
that value  of  Q if  Q were  independent  of  w2.)  Referring  to earlier 
diagrams, worker choices in the present context can occur anywhere on 
or to the right of  the locus w2 =  w2(fi). 
Informational equilibrium in the present context involves a value of 
equal to unity, an employer estimate of  the vector 2  and a corresponding 
vector of  worker consumption, and a correct employer estimate of work- 
er reliability at the contracted level of  w2.  Thus, an equilibrium vector of 
worker consumption has the property that (wl,  w2)  maximizes worker 
utility given the function Q(w2;Z),  and given that R(w2jZ)  =  R(w2;Z). 
Because informational equilibrium does not require that 2  be equal to 2, 
the set of  potential informational equilibria is large. Referring again to 
earlier diagrams, this set consists of  all points that lie (1) either on or to 
the right of  the locus w2  =  w,(fi)-that  is, constitute potential worker 
contract choices and (2) on the locus R =  R(w2)-that  is, involve suspen- 
sion of  learning. 
Only one informational equilibrium can survive competitive experi- 
mentation by employers in the present context. Specifically, starting from 
any other informational equilibrium, experimentation with marginally 
different values for Z by employers seeking higher profits induces work- 
ers to choose new values for w2  and generates additional information 
about the function R(w2;Z).  This new information generates new con- 
tract forms that are more attractive to workers than the initial equilib- 
rium. Given continued experimentation, 2 approaches 2, and the mar- 
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vector of worker consumption that maximizes worker utility subject to 
the full information price schedule Q(w2;Z).  When the market reaches 
competitive equilibrium, employers may not have full knowledge about 
the vector Z; they may, therefore, undertake some further experimenta- 
tion. However, additional information about Z would not generate new 
contract forms more attractive to workers than the contract at competi- 
tive equilibrium. 
9.8  Summary and Implications for Empirical  Research 
This paper has analyzed the stability of workers’ earnings in a context 
where employers, who are less risk averse than workers, absorb from 
workers risk that is associated with fluctuations in the value of  worker 
product. The terms on which employers stabilize workers’ earnings de- 
pend on employers’ estimates of  worker reliability, which is defined as 
the propensity of  workers to comply with risk-shifting agreements that 
they make. The analysis has assumed that employers adjust their esti- 
mates of worker reliability if  new observations on reliability disconfirm 
prior beliefs. In addition, the analysis has assumed that worker reliability 
depends on the terms of  risk-shifting arrangements, as well as on work- 
ers’ exogenous attitudes toward default on contractual commitments. A 
basic result is that the two-way interaction between employer beliefs and 
worker reliability can generate muItiple informational equilibria-that  is, 
more than  one employer  estimate of  worker  reliability can be self- 
confirming. However,  in order for more than one equilibrium to be 
competitive-that  is, invulnerable to individual firms’ competitive ex- 
perimentation with marginally different beliefs-employers must behave 
as  if  worker reliability is exogenous,  and the degree of  worker  risk 
aversion and the distribution of  aversion to default must obey specific 
restrictions. 
An important implication of this result is that, if  employers engage in 
statistical discrimination, identifiable worker groups that are identical 
with respect to risk aversion and the distribution of  attitudes toward 
default among their members can exhibit different reliability and experi- 
ence different stability of  earnings in competitive equilibrium, simply 
because employers initially believe that the groups differ with respect to 
reliability. However, the nature of the necessary conditions suggests that 
such an outcome is unlikely. Nevertheless, even if  intrinsically identical 
groups approach the same competitive equilibrium, a historical legacy of 
discrimination could persist for many years. Specifically, the speed with 
which groups approach competitive equilibrium depends on such factors 
as the frequency with which new data on reliability become available to 
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and general business cycles. Discrimination in the market for risk-shifting 
arrangements could take decades to disappear because cycles in demand 
have a duration of  many months. 
The analysis has also shown that statistical discrimination can either 
magnify or narrow intrinsic behavioral differences between groups. Spe- 
cifically, if  identifiable groups of workers differ with respect to the dis- 
tribution of  aversion to default among their members, then they will 
exhibit different average reliability when allowed to enter risk-shifting 
arrangements on the same terms. However, if  employers absorb risk 
from the groups on different terms, on the basis of a belief that the groups 
differ with  respect  to reliability,  the reliability differentials between 
groups in competitive equilibrium may be greater than, equal to, or less 
than those that would exist in the absence of  statistical discrimination. 
The foregoing analysis suggests that if  statistical discrimination by 
employers in the market for risk-shifting arrangements contributes to the 
racial differential in stability of earnings, and if  employers’ beliefs about 
worker reliability are correct, then whites behave more reliably on aver- 
age than blacks. A basic test of the theory would be to determine whether 
such a difference in reliability actually exists, in the form of  a racial 
differential in the quit rate in periods of high aggregate demand. Unfortu- 
nately, accessible data do not readily provide evidence on this issue. 
However, work on this question continues and some tentative inferences 
from the data may be possible. 
The preceding analysis shows that average reliability differences be- 
tween worker groups could result either from intrinsic differences in the 
distribution  of  attitudes toward default or from initial differences in 
employer  beliefs about  reliability.  If  reliability differences do exist, 
another important and difficult empirical problem would be to determine 
the source of  these differences. 
Notes 
1. If unreliable workers were naive, they might reveal their intention to pay nothing for 
indemnity  income by seeking  agreements that provide very large earnings  when the value of 
worker product is low. In contrast, the present discussion  implicitly  assumes that unreliable 
workers demand indemnity income as if  they plan to act reliably, dissembling their true 
intentions in  order  to avoid  exclusion from risk-shifting arrangements. For  a further 
discussion of  dissembling behavior, see Grossman (1979). 
2.  The analysis also assumes that consumption goods and produced output are the only 
commodities in the economy. Specifically, there are no investment goods, and neither 
consumption goods nor produced output is  storable. These assumptions imply that, in 
aggregate, current consumption is  equal to the value of  current output, and  that, in 
aggregate, the economy cannot smooth out its consumption stream by varying either its 
accumulation  of investment goods or its commodity inventories. Allowing for either invest- 315  Risk Shifting, Statistical Discrimination, and Stability of  Earnings 
ment goods or commodity inventories would make the analysis both more realistic and more 
complex, but would probably not change the main conclusions regarding the market for 
risk-shifting arrangements. 
3.  Jaffee  and Russell  (1976) use  a similar framework  to analyze  the terms  of  loan 
agreements in a competitive credit market. In their model, lenders expect the default rate 
among borrowers to be positively related to the amount owed, and they make the interest 
rate an increasing function of  the amount owed. Consequently, the actual loan size associ- 
ated with any interest rate is smaller than borrowers would demand if  they could obtain 
loans of  any size at that interest rate. Jaffee and Russell denote this outcome as “credit 
rationing.” Moreover, Jaffee and Russell assume that lenders know precisely the relation 
between the default rate and the terms of  loan agreements. The present discussion extends 
their analysis to allow for the possibility that imperfect lender (employer) understanding of 
borrower (worker) default behavior can generate multiple informational equilibria. 
Comment  Dennis W. Carlton 
This is an interesting and instructive paper. It combines ideas from the 
literature on statistical discrimination with those from the literature on 
contracts. It also makes some headway in analyzing the important issue of 
default behavior. A major finding of  the paper is that the existence of 
multiple equilibria could help explain the lower earnings of  blacks rela- 
tive to whites. 
The paper makes very simple assumptions. Such an approach has both 
virtues and costs. One virtue is that the essential ideas can be presented 
clearly and quickly. One cost is the possibility that relaxation of  some of 
the assumptions could fundamentally alter some of  the model’s conclu- 
sions. 
Some of the assumptions could probably be relaxed without changing 
the main results of  the model, though the model would become more 
complicated. For example, firms could be allowed to “cheat” workers 
through layoffs when the value of  the marginal product of  a worker fell 
below price. Firms and workers could acquire reputations for reliability. I 
suspect that the better the information the less likely multiple equilibria 
become. Firms could require advance payments (or investment in job- 
specific skills) to be returned only to nonquitting workers. If  the worker’s 
loss from quitting always equals or exceeds the wage gain from quitting, 
no contracts will be broken. I believe that these relaxations can be made 
in such a way  as to make the model more realistic but still allow for 
(though reduce) the possibility of  multiple equilibria. 
My main criticism is that the paper emphasizes the case where firms 
take quit rates as independent of  the wage. Even in the simple model in 
the first part of  the paper this assumption cannot hold exactly; otherwise 
unreliable  workers would choose as high a payoff  as possible in  the 
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favorable state and as low a payoff as possible in the state in which they 
quit. The authors rule out this case by  assumption-but  it is clearly 
awkward to maintain on the one hand that firms do not realize that wages 
are correlated with quit rates but  on the other hand that unreliable 
workers do not choose high payoffs in the good state and low payoffs in 
the bad state because firms will use wage choices to infer quit probabili- 
ties (i.e., reliability). 
Assuming that firms do not realize that wage rates affect the behavior 
of labor supply strikes me as unrealistic. If firms realize that the supply of 
labor depends on wages they offer, then the problem of  characterizing 
equilibrium reduces to the problem of choosing wages w1  and w2  so as to 
maximize expected utility subject to the budget constraint 
4w1-  Xl) +  a2  R(WZ)(WZ -  XZ)  =  0 
where ai  =  probability of  state i, wi =  wage paid in state i, Xi =  amount 
produced in state i, and R(wZ)  =  probability that a worker quits in un- 
favorable state given a wage w2.  In this formulation, firms recognize that 
the quit rate R will change as wage w2 changes. The budget constraint 
guarantees zero expected profits for firms. The equilibrium (wl, w2)  will 
be a tangency-in  (wl,  w2) space-between  the indifference curves and 
the budget constraint. It is a simple exercise to show under the assump- 
tions of the model that along an indifference  surface d2wzldwl2> 0, while 
along the budget constraint d2w2/dw12  C 0. This means that there can be 
at most one tangency between the indifference curves and the budget 
constraint-hence  we obtain a unique equilibrium. The possibility of 
explaining black-white earning differentials as  arising from  multiple 
equilibria vanishes. I find it disturbing that relaxing what appears to be an 
overly restrictive assumption fundamentally changes one of  the model’s 
results. 
I therefore doubt that much of the black-white earnings inequality can 
be attributed to the multiple equilibria story. Nevertheless the model is a 
rich one with  many empirical applications. For example,  the model 
makes predictions about the relation of  wage rates and reliability, and 
about quit rates in booms. I would encourage the authors to analyze these 
issues with their insightful model. 
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